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I. INTRODUCTION
The wired and wireless networks that collectively make up the Internet are
essential.' In today's society, it is well understood--even axiomatic-that the-
se networks shape our ability to work, educate, play, and socialize.2 On De-
cember 23, 2010, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") created
rules that govern how broadband Internet service providers ("ISPs")' must
treat certain customer data traveling over their networks.' This action was the
first of its kind: regulation of the content of network traffic to combat per-
ceived bad-actor ISPs.
The Open Internet Order is designed to address "net neutrality," also known
as "open Internet."' Roughly, the principles of the open Internet hold that ISPs
t J.D. Candidate, 2012, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
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I See FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND
PLAN (2010), available at http://www.broadband.gov/download-plan [hereinafter NATIONAL
BROADBAND PLAN] .
2 Id. at xi-xv.
3 Examples of ISPs include Comcast, Time Warner Cable, Cox Communications, Veri-
zon, and AT&T.
4 In re Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, Report and Order,
GN Docket No. 09-19 1, WC Docket No. 07-52 (Dec. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Open Internet
Order].
5 The FCC does not use the term net neutrality. It prefers to couch the debate in terms
of Internet "openness." See In re Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Prac-
tices, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 24 F.C.C.R. 13064, 2 (Oct. 22, 2009) ("we seek
public input on draft rules to preserve an open Internet") [hereinafter Open Internet NPRM.
This Comment adopts that convention, because the term "neutrality" implies that Internet
networks should be minimally managed by ISPs in order for everyone to have fair service.
However, it is possible and even desirable that ISPs closely monitor their networks to ensure
fair service. The point is to ensure that such management is equitable.
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should refrain from manipulating the substantive data traveling thorough their
networks for the purpose of network management.' For example, rather than
looking at the name of a legally downloaded song through a peer-to-peer
("P2P") network to determine the amount of bandwidth to allocate to a cus-
tomer, open Internet advocates would argue that an ISP should make its rout-
ing decision based on the fact that the type of traffic is P2P.'
Proponents of an open Internet-those who support minimal ISP involve-
ment in making decisions about how to route data traffic-argue that broad-
band ISPs could exercise or do exercise a great deal of control over the critical
information that passes through their networks.' They argue that, as gatekeep-
ers with incentives to manipulate network traffic, ISPs could block access to a
particular website-or more deviously-degrade the quality of users' connec-
tions to the point that they are discouraged from visiting the website.' In the
proponents' view, regulation of network management to prevent discrimina-
tory behavior is therefore desirable, because discrimination would result in an
overall loss of freedom of information.'0
6 Get Informed About the Open Internet, OPENINTERNET.GOV,
http://www.openintemet.gov/get-informed.html (last visited May 14, 2011). "Network man-
agement" occurs when an ISP actively changes the way that packets (the units of data that
make up all information flowing through Internet networks) are routed through the network.
Kenneth D. Ko and Kevin W. Schneider, Wireline Platform Declaration 12 (Jan. 14, 2010),
attached to In re Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, Comments of
Telecommunications Industry Association, GN Docket No. 09-191 (Jan. 14, 2010),
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020374671 [hereinafter Open Internet
Comments of TIA]. Network management is employed to ensure Quality of Service ("QoS").
George Ou, Managing Broadband Networks: A Policymaker's Guide, INFORMATION TECH-
NOLOGY AND INNOVATION FOUNDATION, at 2 (Dec. 2008),
http://www.itif.org/files/Network Management.pdf. Network management has always been
a basic part of providing service over the Internet. See infra Part IIl.A. Therefore, the ques-
tion is not whether to employ network management, but how to do so in a way that is "rea-
sonable." See Open Internet NPRM, supra note 5, 135-141.
7 See, e.g., In re Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, Com-
ments of Free Press, GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52, at 56 (Jan. 14, 2010)
(available via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System) (supporting protocol-agnostic net-
work management techniques) [hereinafter Comments ofFree Press].
8 Comments of Free Press, supra note 7 at 113-114 ("Network providers control most
of the relevant information about their networks, and average users (even, often, technically
savvy users) have no means to gain awareness of the technology used for network control or
deep packet inspection, or detect when it is occurring.").
9 Id. at 4; In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Com-
cast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications; Broadband Industry
Practices Petition of Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling that Degrading an Internet Ap-
plication Violates the FCC's Internet Policy Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for
"Reasonable Network Management", Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028,
1 (Aug. 1, 2008) ("Moreover, Comcast's failure to disclose the company's practice to its
customers has compounded the harm.") [hereinafter Comcast MO&O].
10 See Tim Wu, Net Neutrality FAQ, http://timwu.org/networkneutrality.html (last
visited May 14, 2011).
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On the other hand, broadband ISPs argue that proposed regulations designed
to curtail questionable network management practices are based largely on un-
founded theories." Moreover, they argue, network management has been, and
always will be, part and parcel of providing Internet access. 2 In their view,
imposing bureaucratic red tape to constrain innovation in network management
will artificially increase the cost of maintaining the network and ultimately
burden the consumer. 3
Although opposing parties will disagree over the sort of conduct that consti-
tutes a violation of open Internet principles, the high-level discussion has fol-
lowed at least three instances of ISP network management practices that ar-
guably fall outside the bounds of reasonableness, as discussed in greater detail
below."' As the number of Internet users grows, and high-bandwidth applica-
tions increase in popularity, broadband ISPs will continue to struggle to effec-
tively manage network traffic." Without clear authority, there may be future
instances of unreasonable network management that the FCC could be power-
less to redress.'" The FCC's Open Internet Order, issued on December 23,
2010, attempts to resolve some of the debate's difficult legal, economic, and
policy problems by adopting policies against outright blocking and discrimina-
tion against consumers and third parties, as well as rules designed to increase
" See, e.g., In re Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, Com-
ments ofAT&TInc., GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52, at 146 (Jan. 14, 2010)
(available via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System)
("Intense competition already supplies consumers with a remarkable range of choices
among wireless services, devices, and applications, and providers can be expected to
continue investing and innovating in order to attract new users. In other words, the
marketplace is thriving in precisely the ways the NPRM advocates, even though the net
neutrality principles have never been applied to wireless services. The facts thus cannot
begin to support the extension of the proposed net neutrality rules to those services."
(internal citations omitted))
[hereinafter Comments of AT&T]; See also infra Part III.C (discussing major instances of
network management violations).
12 Comments ofAT&T, supra note 11 at 34.
13 See id. at 46.
14 See infra Part III.C. These include incidents implicating Comcast, Madison River,
and RCN in mismanaging their networks to the detriment of consumers. See Comcast, 600
F.3d at 644; In re Madison River Communications, LLC and Affiliated Companies, Order,
4, 1 1 (Mar. 3, 2005) (incident where Madison River blocked certain VolP traffic); Chin v.
RCN Corp., No. 08 Civ. 7349 (RJS) (KNF), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96302, at *1-2
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2010) (class action lawsuit against RCN, a broadband ISP).
15 Comments ofAT&T, supra note 11 at 41.
16 Press Release, FCC, A Third-Way Legal Framework for Addressing the Comcast
Dilemma, Statement of General Counsel Austin Schlick 2 (May 6, 2010),
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatch/DOC-297945AI.pdf. This Comment oper-
ates on the assumption that at least some FCC engagement with open Internet issues is de-
sirable, because the financial incentives of ISPs do not necessarily support what consumers
and businesses value: equal access to all of the content and services that the Internet offers
at the fastest possible speed.
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awareness of ISP network management practices." However, the FCC's au-
thority to adopt these regulations is unclear. Given that the Communications
Act, the Commission's enabling statute, does not contemplate Internet regula-
tion, the Commission used its controversial ancillary authority" to give legal
effect to these rules. In doing so, the Commission squarely addressed the D.C.
Circuit's recent opinion in Comcast v. FCC, which struck down the Commis-
sion's previous attempt to use ancillary authority to penalize Comcast's deci-
sion to block network traffic using Bittorrent." The efficacy of the FCC's re-
buttal will be severely tested. Within one month of issuance of the rules, Veri-
zon and MetroPCS filed appeals in the D.C. Circuit to vacate the rules on the
ground that the FCC lacks the requisite authority to promulgate them.20 Fur-
thermore, the FCC already faces considerable pressure from Congress; indeed,
the House of Representatives passed a resolution with the intent to overturn the
Open Internet Order.2'
This Comment argues that, rather than attempt to craft rules at this time, the
FCC should mandate an information collection with respect to network man-
agement practices pursuant to existing, well-defined legal authority. This
Comment will attempt to articulate a way forward that is strong enough to ad-
dress overzealous broadband ISP network management practices-insofar as
harm has been demonstrated to date-without imposing unforeseen burdens on
broadband ISPs' networks. Specifically, the FCC should require broadband
ISPs to submit a form-tempered by appropriate confidentiality provisions-
with questions that improve transparency about network management prac-
'7 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, §4(i), 110 Stat. 56, 58-60
(1996), codifiedat 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (authorizing the Commission to "perform any and all
acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chap-
ter, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.").
'8 See Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 701-02 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (summarizing
the history of ancillary authority).
'9 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Marcel Dischinger et al., De-
tecting Bittorrent Blocking, MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE (2008), http://broadband.mpi-
sws.org/transparency/results/08_imcblocking.pdf.
20 Notice of Appeal, Verizon v. FCC, -F.3d- (D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1014); Mo-
tion to Assign Case to the Panel that Decided Comcast Corp. v. FCC, Verizon v. FCC,
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1014); Sara Jerome, MetroPCS Appeals Net-Neutrality Order,
HILLICON VALLEY (Jan. 25, 2011), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-
valley/technologyd/139935-metro-pcs-appeals-net-neutrality-order. Both the Verizon and
MetroPCS appeals were subsequently dismissed by the D.C. Circuit because they were filed
prematurely. Jonathan Charnitski, Federal Court Dismisses Verizon, MetroPCS Net Neu-
trality Appeals, BROADBANDBREAKFAST.COM (Apr. 5, 2011),
http://broadbandbreakfast.com/2011/04/federal-court-dismisses-verizon-metro-pcs-net-
neutrality-appeals/.
21 See Matthew Lasar, House Passes Anti-Net Neutrality Resolution, Veto Likely, ARS
TECHNICA (Apr. 5, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/04/house-passes-
anti-net-neutrality-resolution-white-house-wams-of-veto.ars.
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tices, both within the FCC and to the public. This collection requirement, ac-
complished through a modification of the existing FCC Form 477,22 would
provide the FCC, Congress, and consumers with valuable insight into broad-
band ISP practices. 23 Most importantly, the FCC could build a data-driven re-
cord that would inform future regulatory or legislative action, if necessary.24
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part II explains the history of FCC
regulations that shape the backdrop for the present debate. Part III explores
problems inherent in the Open Internet Order, and explains how an information
collection requirement would directly address those problems. Finally, Part IV
describes why the FCC has affirmative legal authority to implement a manda-
tory data collection.
II. THE FCC'S REGULATORY CLASSIFICATIONS
Today's open Internet debate is the product of two regulatory decisions: the
decision to classify all communications services into either telecommunica-
tions services or information services, and the decision to craft rules to for-
mally preserve the open nature of the Internet. The history of regulatory classi-
fication began in 1966 with a Commission investigation into "data processing
services," or services using computers to support business operations.25 Over
the course of twenty-nine years, the FCC conducted three rulemakings that are
collectively known as the Computer Inquiries. 26 Although these inquiries arose
primarily in response to competitive concerns, the data processing services at
issue were novel, forcing the Commission to create new definitions that clari-
fied the distinction between the voice communications services and data proc-
22 Form 477 is designed to collect information about broadband deployment nationwide.
See Instructions for Local Telephone Competition and Broadband Reporting (FCC Form
477), FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/Forms/Form477/477inst.pdf (last visited May 14, 2011).
23 Open Internet Order, supra note 4, 1.
24 Chairman Genachowski has repeatedly emphasized the need for and benefits of data-
driven analysis. See, e.g., Julius Genachowski, Written Statement of Julius Genachowski,
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, Before the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, Subcommittee on Communications, Technology, and the Internet, 4 (Sept. 17,
2009), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-293508AI.pdf ("The Amer-
ican people deserve an FCC that ... is data-driven in its decision-making.").
25 In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer
and Communications Services and Facilities, Tentative Decision of the Commission, 28
F.C.C.2d 291, 1 (Apr. 3, 1970) [hereinafter Computer 1].
26 In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Se-
cond Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (Apr. 7, 1980) [hereinafter Com-
puter II]; In re Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Third Computer Inquiry); and Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Com-
mon Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Thereof; Communications Protocols
under Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, Report and Order, 104
F.C.C.2d 958 (May 15, 1986) [hereinafter Computer II].
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essing services.27 Those definitions were carried forward into the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996 (the "1996 Act") largely intact.2' The 1996 Act-which
forms the basis for the FCC's authority to regulate wire and radio communica-
tions but does not explicitly discuss how the FCC should regulate the Inter-
net29-forced the FCC to improvise when it first perceived the need to create
Internet regulations. 30
The catalytic event for the reclassification debate was Comcast's treatment
of customers who were using the P2P program Bittorrent, and the FCC's sub-
sequent reaction. Finding that Comcast had violated its 2005 Internet Policy
Statement, the FCC issued a 2008 order requiring that Comcast follow the ten-
ets of the Internet Policy Statement." On Comcast's appeal, the D.C. Circuit
concluded in 2010 that the FCC had overstepped its jurisdiction and vacated
the FCC's order.32 This was an unexpected blow to the Commission, because
the authority underlying the Comcast order was the same authority the FCC
was using to justify certain of its National Broadband Plan programs.3 In ef-
fect, the D.C. Circuit had issued a decision with a much broader impact that
reached far beyond the Comcast-Bittorrent dispute.
In 2009, prior to the D.C. Circuit's decision in Comcast, the FCC proposed
rules in the Open Internet NPRM to govern ISP network management.34 These
rules effectively codified the Internet Policy Statement.3 ' However, because the
D.C. Circuit decision questioned the Commission's legal authority to enforce
these regulations," the FCC published a Notice of Inquiry ("NOI") seeking
comment on a new legal framework for Internet communications, called the
"third-way."37 This "third-way" proposal would have subjected Internet traffic
to some elements of Title II common carrier regulation. In effect, the NOI
proposed to "reclassify" TCP/IP-based communication from an information
service to a telecommunications service, bringing it more firmly under the
FCC's jurisdiction.
After several months of stagnation, the FCC resolved both the Open Internet
27 See infra Part II.B.
28 See infra Part II.C.
29 The Internet is mentioned in two provisions of the 1996 Act. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 230,
271.
30 See infra Part II.D.
31 Comcast MO&O, supra note 9, 1.
32 ComCast, 600 F.3d at 644.
3 See NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 1, at 337. See also Comcast MO&O,
supra note 9.
34 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 5.
3 Id. 1 6.
36 ComCast, 600 F.3d at 644.
3 In re Framework for Broadband Internet Service, Notice of Inquiry, 25 F.C.C.R.
7866, 1 (June 17, 2010) [hereinafter Broadband Framework NOl].
38 Broadband Framework NOI, supra note 37, 67.
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NPRM and the Broadband Framework NOI on December 23, 2010 with the
release of the Open Internet Order." That order did not adopt the "third-way"
framework as some feared; instead, it relied on substantially the same Title I
justifications the FCC used to fine Comcast.40
A. Computer I
At the time of the Computer I order, providers offered three types of ser-
vices that utilized the phone network 4 : (1) the regulated, legacy telephone
business,42 (2) the emerging "data processing" business,43 and (3) a "hybrid"
service, an integrated service that combined data processing functions with
message-switching." Because these data processing services were novel, the
Commission endeavored to craft new rules to enable competition in that mar-
ket.45
The result was the Computer I order.46 While the FCC found that the data
processing industry was already competitive,47 it noted that telephone compa-
nies with in-house data processing services had a marked advantage over com-
panies that only offered data services-telephone companies could cross-
subsidize the data processing services with revenues from their existing tele-
phone businesses. 48 The FCC decided that the appropriate response was to
force common carriers to structurally separate their data processing businesses
from their telephone business to avoid competitive harm. 49 Although the tele-
phone companies could retain ownership of the data processing business, inter-
action between the two had to be conducted at arm's length.so
Hybrid services presented a special challenge. The Commission defined hy-
brid services as "those offerings of service which combine data processing and
message-switching to form a single integrated service."" The Commission
recognized that the integration of data processing functions into the telephone
network presented a classification problem.52 On the one hand, computers were
39 Open Internet Order, supra note 4.
40 Id. T 115.
41 Computer I, supra note 25, 36.
42 See id. (adopting a separate policy for data processing from regular telephone ser-
vice).
43 Id.
44 Id. 38.
45 Id. 36.
46 Id.
47 Computer 1, supra note 25, 20.
48 Id. 25.
49 Id. 36.
50 Id.
5' Id. 39.
52 Id.
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performing data processing in the sense that they had to perform some algo-
rithmic functions to initiate a call between two end-users." On the other hand,
no data processing was taking place with respect to the content flowing across
the telephone wires-the wires acted as a mere conduit of information.5 4
The Commission's solution was to adopt two definitions with different regu-
latory consequences." Both definitions were based not on the technical charac-
teristics of the service, but on the functionality of the service." If "the data
processing feature or function [were] an integral part of and incidental to mes-
sage-switching,"" the entire service would be classified as a "communications
service for hire" and consequently regulated as a common carrier.s If mes-
sage-switching and data processing were part of a package intending to offer
data processing, "there [would] be total regulatory forbearance with respect to
the entire service."" The Commission's focus on the functionality of hybrid
service vis-i-vis the technical characteristics of the service is an approach that
it would later employ when classifying broadband Internet services.o
B. Computer II
In Computer II, the Commission adopted new definitions to clarify the sepa-
ration between data transmission and data processing." "Basic service" was
defined as a "common carrier offering of transmission capacity for the move-
ment of information."62 In other words, basic service was a pure data transmis-
sion path devoid of any computer processing.63 In contrast, "enhanced ser-
vices" were "computer processing applications that act on the format, content,
code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information, or
provide the subscriber additional, different, or restructured information, or in-
volve subscriber interaction with stored information."' These definitions re-
flected evolving network and computer capabilities since the conclusion of the
Computer I proceeding, particularly the transition of computing power away
from a central host and toward customer equipment."6 The definitions remained
3 Computer I, supra note 25, 39.
54 Id.
55 Id $41-42.
56 Id.
5 Id. T 42.
58 Computer I, supra note 25, T 40.
5 Id 41.
60 See infra Part II.D.
61 Computer II, supra note 26, 5, 20.
62 Id. 5.
63 Id.
6 Id.
65 Id. 19.
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the same until the Telecommunications Act of 1996.6
C. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
Collectively, the Computer Inquiries established the concept that informa-
tion and the conduit for that information are separate things that require sepa-
rate regulatory regimes."7 Sixteen years after the Computer 1I inquiry estab-
lished those definitions, the 1996 Act retrenched them under new names.6 ' Ba-
sic services evolved into "telecommunications services," which were services
offered for a fee, and thus regulated under Title II.69 Telecommunications ser-
vices are defined as "the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to
the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to
the public, regardless of the facilities used.""
Enhanced services evolved into "information services," regulated by ancil-
lary authority." Information services are defined as "the offering of a capabil-
ity for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, util-
izing, or making available information via telecommunications."72
The regulatory impact of the establishment of these two categories of ser-
vice was not immediately felt in the Internet space; 98% of consumers ac-
cessed Internet connections over phone lines, which were owned by the tele-
phone companies and already subject to regulation.73 The catalyst for change
was widespread consumer adoption of broadband cable modem service that
offered increased bandwidth.74
The 1996 Act forms the basis for the FCC's regulatory authority today."
Since the FCC is locked in to its binary regulatory classifications-
telecommunications services or information services-and because the defini-
tions of those classifications lack any reference to the Internet,"6 implementa-
66 The Computer III decision did not affect the basic and enhanced services definitions,
and so is not discussed here. Its major contribution was to replace the structural safeguards
separating AT&T and the Bell Operating Companies' processing services from their tele-
communications services the Commission implemented in Computer 1. Computer III, supra
note 26, T 3.
67 See supra Parts IIA-B.
68 Broadband Framework NOI, supra note 37, 1 13.
69 Id
70 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2006).
7 Broadband Framework NOI, supra note 37, 13.
72 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2006).
73 Broadband Framework NOI, supra note 37, T 13.
74 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 5, 48.
7 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996), codifed
at 47 U.S.C. §153(20).
76 The Internet is only mentioned explicitly in two sections of the 1996 Act. See 47
U.S.C. §§ 230, 271 (2006).
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tion of any rules related to the Internet require what amount to creative work-
arounds such as the FCC's proposed third-way reclassification."
D. Application of the 1996 Act to Broadband Technologies
The first Commission rulemaking interpreting cable modem service under
the 1996 Act's definitions was the Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling in 2002."
Until that point, the regulatory classification of cable broadband was highly
uncertain, being the subject of various complaints, licensing proceedings, mer-
ger reviews, and FCC white papers." None of these treatments were unified."o
To reconcile them, the FCC declared in the Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling
that cable modem services were "information services" and therefore subject to
the Commission's ancillary authority."
In order to arrive at this conclusion, the FCC examined cable ISPs' retail of-
ferings.8 2 The FCC found that cable modem service combined elements of pure
transmission-the coaxial cable itself-with elements of information process-
ing, such as website hosting, domain name system resolution, and e-mail.
More importantly, both elements were sold as a package to customers.84 In the
Commission's view, the integration of the information service and the underly-
ing telecommunications service was, in the aggregate, an information service."
n Broadband Framework NOI, supra note 37, 2.
78 In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other
Facilities; Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling; Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for
Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (Mar. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem De-
claratory Ruling].
79 Id 2.
80 Id.
81 Id 7.
82 Id 39 ("As provided to the end user the telecommunications is part and parcel of
cable modem service and is integral to its other capabilities.").
83 Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 78, 1 38.
84 Id1.
8 Id 38-39. From a technical standpoint, there is no reason why a cable broadband
ISP could not sell a pure transmission service to a customer. Customers could choose their
own web hosting company, e-mail service, or even their own DNS resolution server. Id 1
17 ("At the most basic level, these functions include establishing a physical connection be-
tween the cable system and the Internet by operating or interconnecting with Internet back-
bone facilities. In addition, these functions may include protocol conversion, IP address
number assignment, domain name resolution through a domain name system (DNS), net-
work security, and caching." (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)). Given this pos-
sibility, the Commission could logically have declared that the two services should have
been regulated separately. In fact, as the Broadband Framework NOI describes, it recog-
nized this possibility in the Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling:
The Commission identified a portion of the cable modem service it called 'Internet
connectivity,' which it described as establishing a physical connection to the Internet
and interconnecting with the Internet backbone, and sometimes including protocol
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From 2002 to 2005 the FCC's classification decision was limited to cable
modem service." It took several more years for the FCC to conclude that other
broadband technologies were also information services as a result of the chal-
lenge to its authority in the NCTA v. Brand X case." Specifically, Brand X
questioned whether the Commission was correct to classify cable modem ser-
vice as an information service." In a sharply divided decision, the Supreme
Court overturned the 9th Circuit and affirmed the Commission's classification
of cable modem service as an information service, on the grounds that the
Commission deserved deference as the expert agency charged with regulating
wire and radio communications."
Soon after its victory, the FCC made its classification scheme consistent
across all broadband technologies.o In the Wireline Order, it classified broad-
band Internet access service over telephone facilities" as an information ser-
vice because it, too, combined pure data transmission with data processing ca-
conversion, Internet Protocol (IP) address number assignment, domain name resolution
through a domain name system (DNS), network security, caching, network monitoring,
capacity engineering and management, fault management, and troubleshooting. The
Ruling also noted that '[n]etwork monitoring, capacity engineering and management,
fault management, and troubleshooting are Internet access service functions that are
generally performed at an ISP or cable operator's Network Operations Center (NOC)
or back office and serve to provide a steady and accurate flow of information between
the cable system to which the subscriber is connected and the Internet.' The Commis-
sion distinguished these functions from 'Internet applications [also] provided through
cable modem services,' including 'e-mail, access to online newsgroups, and creating or
obtaining and aggregating content,' 'home pages,' and 'the ability to create a personal
web page.' (internal citations omitted)
Broadband Framework NOI, supra note 37, 16.
86 Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 78, l n.5.
8 Broadband Framework NOI, supra note 37, 18-21; Nat'l Cable & Telecomm.
Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
88 BrandX, 545 U.S. at 975.
89 Id. at 980-86.
90 Broadband Framework NOI, supra note 37, 21.
91 The Wireline Order did not reclassify legacy voice transmission, which was still un-
der Title It jurisdiction. In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet
over Wireline Facilities; Universal Service Obligations of Broadband Providers; Review of
Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecommunications Services;
Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Provision of Enhanced
Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review - Review of Computer Ill and ONA Safeguards
and Requirements; Conditional Petition of the Verizon Telephone Companies for Forbear-
ance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) with Regard to Broadband Services Provided Via Fiber to
the Premises; Petition of the Verizon Telephone Companies for Declaratory Ruling or, Al-
ternatively, for Interim Waiver with Regard to Broadband Services Provided Via Fiber to
the Premises; Consumer Protection in the Broadband Era, Report and Order and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853, 1 9 n.15 (Aug. 5, 2005) ("This Order does not
implicate the current rules or regulatory framework for the provision of access to narrow-
band transmission associated with dial-up Internet access services or other narrowband or
broadband information services when provided by facilities-based wireline carriers.").
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pabilities.9 ' Within two years of that decision, the FCC declared that wireless
broadband service and broadband over power line service were both informa-
tion services, as well.93
E. Proposed Open Internet Regulation
Throughout this transitional period, the FCC declined to directly regulate the
Internet.94 However, it did undertake to describe what it believed to be Internet
users' rights in the Internet Policy Statement.95 That policy statement expresses
the Commission's sense that consumers are entitled to: (1) view content of
their choice, (2) use applications and services of their choice, (3) attach devices
of their choice to the network, and (4) have competition among broadband
providers.96 The FCC made it clear that it would use this policy statement as a
baseline against which it would measure ISP service.97 If the FCC found that a
broadband ISP had "violated" these principles, the FCC would rely on its an-
cillary authority to enforce them."
92 In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities; Universal Service Obligations of Broadband Providers; Review of Regulatory
Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecommunications Services; Computer III
Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Provision of Enhanced Services;
1998 Biennial Regulatory Review - Review of Computer III and ONA Safeguards and Re-
quirements; Conditional Petition of the Verizon Telephone Companies for Forbearance
Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) with Regard to Broadband Services Provided Via Fiber to the
Premises; Petition of the Verizon Telephone Companies for Declaratory Ruling or, Alterna-
tively, for Interim Waiver with Regard to Broadband Services Provided Via Fiber to the
Premises; Consumer Protection in the Broadband Era, Report and Order and Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, 1-4 (Aug. 5, 2005).
9 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 5, 40.
94 Broadband Framework NOI, supra note 37, T 4.
9 In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities; Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecommu-
nications Services; Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company
Provision of Enhanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of Computer
III and ONA Safeguards and Requirements; Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the
Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities; Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling; Appro-
priate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities,
Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986 (Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Internet Policy Statement].
96 Internet Policy Statement, supra note 95, 4. The Internet Policy Statement was not
the Commission's only attempt to establish itself within the Internet regulatory space. Two
years after the Internet Policy Statement was issued, the Commission took a bold step by
promulgating a notice of inquiry seeking to obtain "a fuller understanding of the behavior of
broadband market participants today" by seeking comment on "packet management prac-
tices," and pricing for broadband services. In re Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of
Inquiry, 22 F.C.C.R. 7894, T 8 (Mar. 22, 2007). It also considered "whether the [Internet]
Policy Statement should be amended." Id. T 10.
97 Internet Policy Statement, supra note 95, 5.
98 See id. TT 2-3.
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In 2009, as a result of explosive growth in the broadband market and Com-
cast's missteps with respect to its network management practices, the FCC
tried to take a step forward by issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking
("NPRM") that, if adopted, would effectively codify the Internet Policy State-
ment as law.9 Its rationale was to promote innovation, investment, and compe-
tition by ensuring an open playing field among broadband ISPs and the con-
tent, applications, services, and devices that utilize their networks.'o
The Commission proposed adding two additional principles to the four ex-
isting ones.'o' First, a principle of nondiscrimination: "[s]ubject to reasonable
network management, a provider of broadband Internet access service must
treat lawful content, applications, and services in a nondiscriminatory man-
ner."'02 Discrimination, in this context, appears to address the interrelationship
between pricing and service.10 The Commission proposed that a broadband
ISP would violate this rule if it were to charge two different prices for the pro-
vision of substantially equivalent services over a network.'" This rule would
prevent broadband ISPs from choosing market winners and losers through ar-
bitrary pricing schemes that do not consider the value of the service to con-
sumers. 05
The second new principle, the principle of transparency, stated that:
"[s]ubject to reasonable network management, a provider of broadband Inter-
net access service must disclose such information concerning network man-
agement and other practices as is reasonably required for users and content,
application, and service providers to enjoy the protections specified in this
part.""' In support of this principle, the FCC stated "sunlight is the best disin-
fectant.""' Transparency enables predictability; in the open Internet context,
the FCC noted, "disclosure rules would enable broadband subscribers to under-
stand and take advantage of the technical capabilities and limitations of the
99 Id. % 8- 10.
100 Id. 10.
101 Id. 16.
102 Id 104.
103 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 5, 103 ("the ability of network operators to dis-
criminate in price or service quality among different types of traffic or different providers or
users may impose significant social costs").
104 Id. 1 106 ("We understand the term 'nondiscriminatory' to mean that a broadband
Internet access service provider may not charge a content, application, or service provider
for enhanced or prioritized access to the subscribers of the broadband Internet access service
provider, as illustrated in the diagram below. We propose that this rule would not prevent a
broadband Internet access service provider from charging subscribers different prices for
different services." (emphasis added)).
105 See id. 1 103 (noting that discrimination may be motivated by anticompetitive con-
cerns).
106 Id. 119.
107 Id. 118.
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services they purchase."' Transparency is also beneficial to those service pro-
viders whose businesses are built on broadband networks because they can
tailor their services according to the capability of the underlying network.'"
Perhaps most importantly, transparency enables decision-makers like the
Commission and Congress to take more informed regulatory action and moni-
tor the effectiveness of regulation."'
F. The Comcast Case
In 2007, a group of Comcast subscribers suspected that Comcast was ac-
tively interfering with their Bittorrent traffic."' The Associated Press and the
Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF") investigated, and concluded that Com-
cast was indeed blocking Bittorrent traffic by actively interrupting the signal of
Comcast subscribers." 2 Soon afterward, Free Press and Public Knowledge,
joined by a coalition of other interested parties, filed a petition for declaratory
ruling with the FCC seeking an enforcement action against Comcast on the
grounds that Comcast violated the principles of the Internet Policy State-
ment."'
The result of that petition was an FCC order that found that Comcast had, in
fact, violated its principles."' Although Comcast had already agreed to cease
blocking the Bittorrent application, the Commission ordered Comcast to dis-
close its network management practices,"' and put Comcast on notice that an
automatic injunction would issue if Comcast failed to comply with the terms of
the order."' Comcast then brought a suit against the FCC, arguing, among oth-
er things, that the FCC did not have jurisdiction to issue its order because the
Commission had failed to make the case that its ancillary authority was appli-
cable. "'
Throughout the history of these classification decisions leading up to the
D.C. Circuit's April 2010 decision in Comcast v. FCC, the Commission be-
lieved that its ancillary authority was sufficient to support some limited form
of Internet regulation."' It came as a rude awakening, then, when the D.C. Cir-
108 Id. 19.
109 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 5, 1 118.
110 Id. 119.
II Comcast MO&O, supra note 9, 6.
112 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 644.
"13 Id
114 ComCast MO&O, supra note 9, 1.
"5 Id
116 Id. 55.
"1 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 652 ("Comcast argues that neither section 230(b) nor section 1
can support the Commission's exercise of ancillary authority").
118 Broadband Framework NOI, supra note 37, 26.
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cuit decided that the FCC's reasoning was flawed."' The court had accepted
not one of the myriad of rationales the Commission used to argue that it had
the ability to punish Comcast for effectively blocking the Bittorrent applica-
tion.'20 Although the court acknowledged the FCC's broad subject matter juris-
diction over communications, it ultimately agreed with Comcast on the
grounds that the Commission's ability to invoke ancillary authority is not un-
limited; were it otherwise, the court explained, the Commission would be able
to delegate powers to itself far beyond the scope of its enabling statute. 2' In-
stead, the Commission had to bind Title I to more concrete authority found in
another Title of the 1934 Act.'22 The Commission perceived this to be a major
blow to its open Internet initiatives.'23
G. The "Reclassification" Proceeding
The Commission's interpretation of the Comcast decision unilaterally halted
its efforts to promote the objectives of the National Broadband Plan.'24 To re-
cover, the Commission issued a Notice of Inquiry on June 17, 2010 seeking
comment on a new legal theory that FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski la-
beled the "third way."' 25 Specifically, the Commission proposed to reverse the
Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling and the subsequent orders classifying
broadband technologies as information services. It would do so by separately
recognizing the telecommunications (i.e., the pure transmission) component of
ISP services and the information service component of ISP services.126 "Inter-
net connectivity service" would describe the telecommunications component,
119 Austin Schlick, A Third-Way Legal Framework for Addressing the Comcast Di-
lemma, FCC, 2 (May 6, 2010), http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-
297945Al.pdf.
120 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 658-61.
121 ComCast, 600 F.3d at 654 ("The [Midwest Video II] Court rejected that broad claim
and, revealing the flaw in the argument the Commission makes here, emphasized that 'with-
out reference to the provisions of the Act directly governing broadcasting, the Commis-
sion's [ancillary] jurisdiction . . . would be unbounded."' (quoting Midwest Video II, 440
U.S. at 706 (emphasis in original))).
122 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 654 ("Although policy statements may illuminate that authority,
it is Title II, III, or VI to which the authority must ultimately be ancillary.").
123 Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, A Third-Way Legal Frame-
work for Addressing the Comcast Dilemma, Statement of General Counsel Austin Schlick
(May 6, 2010), http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-297945A l.pdf.
124 Id
125 Broadband Framework NOI, supra note 37, 2.
126 Id. In other words, the Commission had previously determined that broadband ISPs
offered only information services (despite that it recognized that broadband ISPs might be
offering both telecommunications and information services). The Commission is now pro-
posing to recognize that broadband ISPs offer both telecommunications ("Internet connec-
tivity service") and information services ("Internet access service"). Id. I n.1.
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and "broadband Internet service" would refer to the bundle of services that
make up the information service component.127 The Commission proposed that
Internet connectivity service, as a telecommunications service, would be regu-
lated under those provisions of Title II that the Commission would find appli-
cable to broadband Internet services."' As before, the information services
would remain subject to Title I ancillary authority.129
Since Title II was not designed with Internet applications in mind, the
Commission proposed to use its section 10 forbearance authority to limit that
title's application to Internet connectivity services.' This approach would
have enabled the FCC to obtain powerful, common carrier regulatory authority
over broadband ISPs,'"' obviating the need to use ancillary authority. There-
fore, the FCC would have had clear authority to implement the principles ar-
ticulated in the Open Internet NPRM as a consequence of "reclassification" 3 2
from Title I to Title II.'3
H. Reactions to Proposed Reclassification and Furtherance of the Open
Internet Debate
The public comments filed in the Broadband Framework NOI's docket
demonstrate that the reclassification-with-forbearance proposal engendered
strong opinions. These fall into two basic categories.'34 Advocates of reclassifi-
cation generally agree that reclassification is the appropriate course of action
because reclassification would give the Commission the robust authority it
needs in order to carry out its broadband agenda.'3 1 Opponents of reclassifica-
127 Id. l n.l.
128 Id. 2.
129 Id. 28.
130 Id. 2.
'3 See supra Part IIE.
132 To lay out the regulatory terminology more clearly: "data transmission" under Com-
puter I became "basic service" under Computer II, which became "telecommunications
service" under the 1996 Act. Likewise, "data processing" under Computer I became "en-
hanced service" under Computer II, which became "information service" under the 1996
Act. Computer I, supra note 25; Computer II, supra note 26. Under the Broadband Frame-
work NOI, the two terms used to describe what broadband ISPs offer to consumers are "In-
ternet connectivity service" (a telecommunications service) and "broadband Internet ser-
vice" (an information service). Broadband Framework NOI, supra note 37, 1 1 n. 1. Note,
however, that the Commission has sought comment on the precise meaning of Internet con-
nectivity service. Id. $T 63-65.
133 Id. %1 28-29 (noting that "the full weight of Title II requirements would apply" to
telecommunications services).
134 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 5, 60-61 (noting two different views of net neu-
trality and stating that it is in the Commission's interest to investigate it).
135 See In re Framework for Broadband Internet Service, Comments of Public Knowl-
edge, GN Docket No. 10-127, at 1-3 (Jul. 15, 2010).
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tion principally argue that the FCC does not need to take action because broad-
band ISPs lack incentives to block or degrade network traffic,"' reclassifica-
tion would distort or complicate engineering decisions,' reclassification
would lead to considerable regulatory uncertainty, 3 3 and that the reclassifica-
tion proposal itself could be legally flawed on jurisdictional grounds.'
The difficulty of reconciling the interrelationship between reclassification
and open Internet issues forced the FCC to renew discussion of the Open Inter-
net NPRM on September 1, 2010.140 For some months prior, the broadband
industry and the FCC conducted a series of closed-door meetings in an attempt
arrive at consensus on open Internet rules.' 4' However, the FCC discontinued
the meetings as a result of mounting negative publicity, leaving the issue in a
dead space. 4 2 At the height of the debate, Verizon and Google published a
"legislative proposal" that significantly reduced the FCC's role over regulation
of network management practices in favor of using industry coalitions to estab-
lish uniform practices, as well as establishing separate regulatory treatment of
wireline and wireless broadband networks.1"
A lack of concrete data contributed significantly to the contentious nature of
these meetings.'" To date, there have been only three major instances where
broadband ISP network management practices have been called into ques-
tion.'5 Comcast, described above, is one of the most widely used examples of
36 Comments ofAT&T, supra note 11, at 17.
1 See In re Framework for Broadband Internet Service, Reply Comments of Telecom-
munications Industry Association, GN Docket No. 10-127, at 9 (Aug. 12, 2010).
138 See In re Framework for Broadband Internet Service, Reply Comments of Time War-
ner Cable Inc., GN Docket No. 10-127, at 31 (Aug. 12, 2010).
139 See In re Framework for Broadband Internet Service, Reply Comments of National
Cable & Telecommunications Association, GN Docket No. 10-127, at 9 (Aug. 12, 2010).
140 Further Inquiry Into Two Under-developed Issues in the Open Internet Proceeding,
Public Notice, 25 F.C.C.R. 12637 (Sept. 1, 2010).
"I Matthew Lasar, Back Room Net Neutrality Deal? Reform Groups Up in Arms, ARS
TECHNICA (June 21, 2010), http://arstechnica.com/telecom/news/2010/06/back-room-net-
neutrality-deal-reform-groups-up-in-arms.ars.
142 Nate Anderson, No Private Net Neutrality Deal . . .Yet, ARs TECHNICA (Sept. 1,
2010), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/09/no-private-net-neutrality-deal-
yet.ars.
143 Verizon-Google Legislative Framework Proposal, GOOGLE, 2,
http://static.googleusercontent.com/extemalcontent/untrusteddlcp/www.google.com/en/us
/googleblogs/pdfs/verizon googlelegislative framework proposal 08101 0.pdf (last visited
May 14, 2011) ("Regulatory authorities would not be permitted to regulate broadband Inter-
net access service.").
144 See infra Part III.C.
145 The Madison River, RCN, and Comcast cases form the bulk of the evidence against
broadband ISPs. Infra Part III.C. Note that this analysis focuses on the network management
aspects of NN and not the blatant sort of application blocking which the FCC also includes
in its analysis.
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the broadband ISP behavior that advocates of reclassification fear.146 In a sec-
ond case, Madison River v. FCC, cable provider Madison River cut off certain
VolP services to its customers.147 In a third, RCN reached a settlement agree-
ment disclaiming that it performed any wrongdoing with respect to its network
management practices.148
Advocates of reclassification and an open Internet have touted these cases,
especially Comcast, as conclusive evidence that broadband ISPs have the in-
centive to continue to use network management practices that go beyond the
bounds of reasonableness.149 But because there is no clear definition of--or
agency precedent for-what constitutes a "reasonable" practice,' and there
are no reports of widespread abuse of network management, the FCC has a
limited picture of the potential harms."'
Moreover, as the number of Internet users grows rapidly, especially wireless
Internet users, broadband ISPs may no longer be able to rely on expansion of
physical network infrastructure to accommodate them; build-out is extremely
expensive, but may only result in moderate increases in network throughput.'52
The more attractive option for broadband ISPs is to turn to network manage-
ment to accommodate increases in data throughput.' The question then be-
comes how strong of a network management policy broadband ISPs can use
without infringing on consumer rights to have free access to information. 54
Currently, the answer to that question is unknown.'
I. The Open Internet Order
However, the FCC appears to have abandoned the reclassification approach
146 See supra Part II.F
147 Infra Part III.C.
148 Infra Part III.C.
149 See, e.g., In re Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, Reply
Comments ofFree Press, GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52, at 20, and 20 n.45
(Apr. 26, 2010) (available via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System) [hereinafter Reply
Comments ofFree Press].
150 Cf Verizon-Google Legislative Proposal, supra note 154, at 1, with Open Internet
NPRM, supra note 5, 135 (showing the varying definitions of what constitutes reasonable
network management, involving varying degrees of specificity).
151 See, e.g., In re Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, Com-
ments of Cox Communications, Inc., GN Docket No. 09-19 1, WC Docket No. 07-52, at 32-
33 (Jan. 14, 2010) (available via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System) ("there is no
demonstrated need for any further action at this time").
152 Infra Part III.B.
15 Infra Part II.B.
154 See infra Part III.D.
I Again, there are a paucity of examples from which to determine what should and
should not constitute reasonable network management. See infra Part III.C.
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in favor of a compromise solution.' In its December 2010 Open Internet Or-
der, the FCC asserted its ancillary authority to adopt a heavily modified ver-
sion of the open Internet rules originally proposed in the 2009 Open Internet
NPRM.'57
The rules adopted by the Open Internet Order are nuanced. First, the FCC
confined the scope of the rules to the last-mile connection between the cus-
tomer and the broadband ISP's local node.' Therefore, the rules designed to
ensure consumer access to all or substantially all other Internet endpoints do
not apply to services that do not connect directly to end-users, such as content-
delivery networks, or virtual private networks.' The competitive issues under-
lying such services are different from those that govern broadband service to
consumers, and so they fall outside the scope of the proceeding.'"
Second, the FCC adopted three basic rules: transparency, in the form of vol-
untary disclosure of network management practices; no blocking, to prevent
broadband ISPs from engaging in anticompetitive behavior; and no unreason-
able discrimination, to ensure that customers' Internet connections would not
be slowed to a crawl when using particular services."'
The transparency rule requires broadband ISPs to "publicly disclose accu-
rate information regarding the network management practices" of their ser-
vices, "sufficient for customers to make informed choices."' 62 Those disclo-
sures include information about network practices, performance characteristics
of the network, and commercial terms."' Although the FCC requires disclo-
sure, there is no mandatory list or mandatory format for disclosure; the Order
requires only "sufficient" clarity."
The no blocking rule prohibits broadband ISPs from blocking "lawful con-
tent, applications, or non-harmful devices, subject to reasonable network man-
agement."' 65 No blocking in this context includes degradation of a network
connection to the point that it no longer effectively transports data."' Signifi-
cantly, the FCC prohibits broadband ISPs from charging third-party applica-
156 Open Internet Order, supra note 4, 9, 115-16.
' Id
158 Id. 45, 49 (limiting the scope of the rules to "mass market" services, and defining
"fixed broadband Internet access service" to encompass only service that "serves end users
primarily at fixed endpoints using stationary equipment, such as the modem that connects an
end user's home router, computer, or other Internet access device to the network." (empha-
sis added)).
15 Id. 47.
160 Open Internet Order, supra note 4, 1 47.
161 Id 1.
162 Id, 54.
163 Id. 56.
16 Id. 54.
165 Open Internet Order, supra note 4, 63.
166 Id. T 66.
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tion and content providers a fee to remove a block, effectively preventing
broadband ISPs from segregating services behind paywalls."'
The no unreasonable discrimination rule prohibits broadband ISPs from "un-
reasonably discriminat[ing]" against lawful network traffic to the end-user.'68
The purpose of this rule is to enable "beneficial forms of differential treat-
ment."'69 The FCC employs a balancing test to determine whether network
management is discriminatory or not."' The FCC will consider a number of
factors if it decides to adjudicate a complaint. Such factors include, but are not
limited to, the level of transparency of the broadband ISP, end-user control,
use-agnostic discrimination, industry-standard practices, whether competitive
services are being unduly targeted, whether user access is inhibited, whether
the practice impairs free expression, and whether pay-for-priority arrangements
exist."
Third, the FCC adopted a definition of reasonable network management to
clarify what network engineering practices are acceptable to manage conges-
tion on the network.172
A network management practice is reasonable if it is appropriate and tai-
lored to achieving a legitimate network management purpose, taking into ac-
count the particular network architecture and technology of the broadband In-
ternet access service. 73
Legitimate network management practices include maintenance of network
security or integrity, and alleviating the effects of network traffic congestion."'
However, the precise meaning of "appropriate" and "tailored" must be decided
on a case-by-case basis.17
Wireless networks receive different treatment,"' except with respect to the
transparency rule."'7 The transparency rule remains the same because the FCC
has a significant interest in continually monitoring the state of the wireless in-
dustry as it evolves so the regulatory framework can keep up."' Furthermore,
the transparency rule at most imposes an administrative burden that should not
have a significant effect on wireless ISPs' businesses.1
67 Id. 67.
168 Id. 68.
169 Id. 69.
170 Open Internet Order, supra note 4, 70-77.
171 Id.
172 Id.
1 Id.
174 Id.
1s Open Internet Order, supra note 4, 83.
176 See id. 96 ("we conclude it is appropriate to take measured steps at this time to pro-
tect the openness of the Internet when accessed through mobile broadband").
1' Id. T 97.
178 Id
179 Id % 59, 98 n.302 (incorporating the fixed broadband transparency discussion at
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In the wireless context, the no blocking rule is modified to be narrower, ap-
plying only to websites and applications "that compete with the provider's
voice or video telephony services."'s This effectively means that a wireless
broadband provider could block everything except web content and competing
voice applications, or sequester them behind separate subscription services.'
Finally, the discrimination rule is not applied to wireless broadband at all.'
III. ENFORCING TRANSPARENCY THROUGH DATA
Having completed this whirlwind tour of the open Internet debate, Part III
will accomplish three objectives. First, it will build some foundational knowl-
edge of network management to explain not only why it is necessary, but also
why it is necessary to continue monitoring its use." Second, it will walk
through the three major occurrences of ISP misconduct or alleged misconduct
that appear to undergird the open Internet debate. Third, operating on the as-
sumption that the regulatory response should be proportional to the harm or
potential harm demonstrated by these cases, this section outlines an alternative
solution based on transparency: a mandatory information collection focused on
network management that would piggyback on the FCC's existing broadband
data collection form.184
A. Internet Architecture
The Internet is a collection of networks that, in the aggregate, create one
global network.' This global network enables "end-to-end" communication-
it allows any computer to communicate with any other computer.' Initially,
the Internet was not an end-to-end network. During their infancy in the 1950s
and 1960s, computer networks had their own set of hardware, software, and
protocol suites that were mutually exclusive. In the same way that an English
paragraph 59, where the Commission states that any administrative burden imposed on ISPs
is outweighed by the interests of consumers and edge providers "to make informed choic-
es.").
180 Id 99.
181 Cf Open Internet Order, supra note 4, 163 with Open Internet Order, supra note 4,
99 (indicating that the no blocking rule for fixed broadband Internet access services has a
much larger scope than the rule for mobile broadband Internet access service, so by infer-
ence the no blocking rule for mobile broadband Internet access service only protects a sub-
set of the whole as defined by the fixed services rule).
182 Id 104.
1 See infra Part III.C.
184 See infra Part III.D.
185 ERIC A. HALL, INTERNET CORE PROTOCOLS: THE DEFINITIvE GUIDE 4 (2000).
186 Open Internet Order, supra note 4, T 13 n.13; See also ERIC A. HALL, INTERNET CORE
PROTOCOLS: THE DEFINITIvE GUIDE 6 (2000).
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speaker cannot understand a Mandarin Chinese speaker,'" a user operating on
one network was physically and logically incapable of communicating with a
user on another network."
Thus, while a computer network was very useful for disseminating informa-
tion within that network, it was difficult to communicate that knowledge
widely.' As computers became critical tools, the military took the initiative to
interconnect them, leading to the development of ARPANET.' ARPANET
became a focal point of interconnection, gathering up isolated research net-
works."' But the problem remained that these networks were patched together
rather than truly integrated through a common language.'92 The solution to that
problem was TCP/IP, the protocol suite that is still used today as the basis of
Internet communication. "
Unlike the telephone network-where communication relies upon central
switches and dedicated circuits-computers use TCP/IP, relying on discrete
units of information called packets that independently contain all the informa-
tion necessary to reach their destinations.19 The significance of this difference
cannot be overestimated. Once a caller picks up a telephone and dials a num-
ber, that caller is confined to aural communication via the transmission path
opened by the telephone company's switches.9 ' In contrast, a computer user
with TCP/IP is agnostic to the type of data being sent and the types of net-
works through which that data is routed.'
Many consequences follow from this architectural difference. The most well
known is that the network becomes more robust because there is no central
point that will bring down the entire network if destroyed.' Furthermore, us-
ers are imbued with greater control at the edges of the network because they
have the ability to shape the way they communicate with other users.
B. An Overview of Network Management
Although TCP/IP is interoperable and sufficient for many Internet applica-
187 ERIC A. HALL, INTERNET CORE PROTOCOLS: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE 1-2 (2000).
188 Id.
189 Id
190 Id
191 Id
192 Id. at 2-3.
193 ERIC A. HALL, INTERNET CORE PROTOCOLS: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE 3 (2000).
194 Id. at 4.
19 Id. at 41.
196 See id at 10 ("IP provides a virtual representation of the network that is independent
of any of the individual network segments, acting more like a national delivery service than
a local courier service").
191 Id. at 14.
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tions, it is not necessarily efficient.'" Packets delivered through TCP/IP are not
guaranteed to arrive at their destination. Even if they do arrive, they may not
arrive in order, and are subject to congestion over the networks they travel. As
a result, Internet networks have always employed some form of traffic man-
agement.' 9
Congestion on the Internet is like congestion on highways.200 In some
places, highways merge from more lanes to fewer lanes.201 Traffic jams occur
at these bottlenecks when there are too many cars attempting to shift into a
smaller space, forcing drivers to slow down to accommodate the change in
speed.202 Internet networks experience the same problem.203 The largest data
pipes, called "backbone" connections, are analogous to highways with many
lanes-both allow greater volume and faster traffic flow versus smaller roads
or connections.2" When packets transition from a larger pipe to a smaller pipe,
they must compete with other packets, producing a traffic jam. 205
Network management techniques can alleviate congestion at these "merging
lanes." 206 For example, computers managing data traffic merging from a larger
facility to a smaller facility might buffer, or hold in suspension, some packets
in order to facilitate faster data transmission across the smaller data pipe.207 if
this basic form of network management were disallowed, Internet transmis-
sions would be significantly less efficient.200
Adding network capacity in the form of larger data buffers or faster connec-
198 See id. at 16.
199 GEORGE OU, MANAGING BROADBAND NETWORKS: A POLICYMAKER'S GUIDE, Informa-
tion Technology and Innovation Foundation, 3 (Dec. 2008), available at
http://www.itif.org/files/NetworkManagement.pdf.
200 See id. at 27 fig.7. Figure 7 that Ou provides graphically depicts the conceptual func-
tioning of the Internet as a series of connections that gradually decrease in terms of their
capacity. Id. Roads share the same basic architecture: some are large and have higher speed
limits, others are small and have lower speed limits. Where they interconnect, bottlenecks
may occur.
201 Id
202 Id.
203 See id. (depicting the locations within the network that experience bottlenecks).
204 See Ou, supra note 199, at app. A (analogizing broadband Internet connections-
those with high capacity-to highways with many lanes).
205 See id. at 27.
206 Congestion occurs when the "sum total rate for the traffic entering a node [exceeds]
the rate at which the same traffic can exit the node." Kenneth D. Ko and Kevin W. Schnei-
der, Wireline Platform Declaration, at 5 (Jan. 14, 2010), attached to Open Internet Com-
ments of TIA, supra note 6.
207 See Ou, supra note 199, at 36 ("[w]ired networks have routers and switches that
prevent packets from colliding on the same wire by using memory buffers called packet
queues").
208 See id. at 2, 4 (noting that even the highest-capacity networks can suffer from some
delay absent network management; therefore, some network management is required re-
gardless of capacity).
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tions between nodes can help ease congestion, but it is an inefficient way to do
so for two reasons.20 First, it is expensive to upgrade existing facilities simply
to obtain more capacity.2 0 Second, the "bursty" nature of Internet data trans-
missions, similar to several cars traveling in relative proximity on a highway,
means that high-capacity data pipes can become congested even if the overall
amount of network traffic is small."' In network terminology, this rapid fluc-
tuation it network traffic loads is called "jitter."2 2 As long as there are large
and small data pipes that comprise the network, some amount of jitter will al-
ways be present.2 3 Therefore, network management will always be necessary,
no matter how fast the capacity of networks expands.2 4
If network management is a basic element of network architecture, then why
is it so closely scrutinized? Network management occurs internally to the ISP
operating the network.2 5 The ISP owns the equipment and operates the soft-
ware required to implement network management policies.216 Furthermore, it is
under no obligation to disclose the specific contours of those policies.2 17 Ab-
sent a concerted effort to understand a network's topology through technical
study, as the plaintiff in the RCN case did,218 users outside the network cannot
know what an ISP is prioritizing. ISPs can therefore operate as gatekeepers if
they choose to do so without explicit oversight. Open Internet proponents be-
lieve that ISPs have incentives to abuse their gate-keeping powers, which
threatens the end-to-end nature of the Internet.
C. Case Studies of Open Internet Violations
Open Internet proponents usually point to three main examples of open In-
ternet violations.
1. Madison River (2005)
One of the first and most widely reported open Internet violations was per-
209 See id.
210 See id. at 3.
211 See id. at 26.
212 Id.
213 See Ou,supra note 199, at 27.
214 Id. at 2, 5.
215 See id. at 2-5 (discussing the various applications of network management).
216 Id.
217 Recall that the Open Internet Order only requires ISPs to disclose their practices in
general terms.
218 Chin v. RCN Corp., 08 Civ. 7349 (RJS)(KNF), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31272, at *2-3
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2010).
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petrated by Madison River Communications, LLC ("Madison River").2 19 Madi-
son River was a communications company in North Carolina that engaged in
blocking VoIP traffic.22 0 Vonage, a provider of VoIP services, brought a com-
plaint against Madison River in February 2005,221 claiming that Madison River
was "port blocking" its Internet traffic and the traffic of other, smaller VoIP
providers. 22 Port blocking is a type of network management technique in
which ISPs block access to certain channels of communication, "ports,"
through which Internet traffic flows. 223 Because different types of Internet ser-
vices use different ports, port blocking effectively enables an ISP to grant or
deny access to particular services while they are using the ISP's network.224
The FCC investigated Vonage's claims, which resulted in a consent decree
barely one month after Vonage's complaint. 25 The FCC found that Madison
River had violated 47 U.S.C. § 201(b), which requires telecommunications
service providers to conduct themselves in a "just and reasonable" manner.26
Madison River agreed to pay a fine of $15,000 and to stop its VoIP port block-
ing practice for thirty months.227
Since the consent decree preceded an FCC investigation, the actual extent-
and, more importantly, rationale-for Madison River's port blocking practices
were not discussed. 2 8 Madison River's motives could have ranged from
wholly rational cost-cutting measures, to blatant anti-competitiveness, to a phi-
losophical disagreement with Vonage's business.2 2 9 Thus, while it is clear that
219 Declan McCullagh, Telco Agrees to Stop Blocking VolP Calls, CNET (Mar. 3, 2005),
http://news.cnet.com/Telco-agrees-to-stop-blocking-VoIP-calls/2100-7352 3-5598633.html.
See also Open Internet NPRM, supra note 5, 32 (briefly describing the Madison River
violation). Madison River was used by public interest advocates in the complaint against
Comcast. In re Broadband Industry Practices, Comments of the Consumer Federation of
America, Consumers Union and Free Press, WC Docket No. 07-52, at 107 (Jan. 14, 2010)
(available via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System) ("For example, in 2005 Vonage, a
provider of Internet telephone service over broadband access facilities, complained to the
FCC that Madison River Telephone Company had blocked ports used for VoIP applications,
effectively disabling consumers' ability to utilize VolP.").
220 Id
221 Ben Chamy, Vonage Says Broadband Provider Blocks Its Calls, CNET (Feb. 14,
2005), http://news.cnet.com/Vonage-says-broadband-provider-blocks-its-calls/2 100-
7352 3-5576234.html.
222 In re Madison River Communc'ns, LLC and Affiliated Companies, Consent Decree,
20 F.C.C.R. 4296, 1 1 (Mar. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Madison River Decree].
223 See ERIC A. HALL, INTERNET CORE PROTOCOLS: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE 20 (2000)
(explaining that port numbers act as gateways for incoming and outgoing network traffic).
224 Id.
225 Madison River Decree, supra note 222.
226 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006); Madison River Decree, supra note 222, 1.
227 Madison River Decree, supra note 222, 4, 19.
228 Id. 4 (agreeing to pay a fine "[t]o avoid the expenditure of additional resources that
would be required to further litigate the issues raised in the Investigation").
229 Compare In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Com-
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Madison River used its network management practices in a way that harmed an
Internet-based service, the case does not conclusively establish that open Inter-
net rules are necessary to protect against anti-competitive conduct.
2. Comcast/Bittorrent (2007-2009)
Comcast/Bittorrent is one of the most widely touted examples of open Inter-
net violations because it is one of the more well-documented abuses of net-
work management practices.230 Part II above describes the basic facts that ulti-
mately led to the FCC's reclassification proceeding.23' However, more detail is
required to be able to compare this instance of mismanagement to other alleged
violations. In 2007, certain users began to notice and complain of interruptions
in their Bittorrent traffic.232 The strength of the complaints was sufficient that
two parties, the EFF and the Associated Press, formally investigated Com-
cast.233 Using open source network monitoring tools, both parties concluded
that Comcast was interfering with Bittorrent traffic using "reset packets."234
Upon detection of Bittorrent traffic, Comcast would send packets with reset
signals that would trick the customer's computer into thinking that its connec-
tion to P2P servers had been interrupted. 235 The result was either degradation or
outright blocking of connections.236
Comcast initially denied that it managed Bittorrent traffic. 237 However, in
the face of mounting pressure and increasing attention from regulators, Com-
cast gradually conceded that it was actively managing Bittorrent traffic.238 Its
justification was that Bittorrent traffic heavily burdened its network, resulting
in a loss of available bandwidth to customers on the same local network as
those customers using Bittorrent, a loss of service quality, and financial
cast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications; Broadband Industry
Practices Petition of Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling that Degrading an Internet Ap-
plication Violates the FCC's Internet Policy Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for
"Reasonable Network Management," Petition for Declaratory Ruling of Free Press, et al.,
File No. EB-08-IH-1518, WC Docket No. 07-52, at 6 (Nov. 1, 2007) (implying that Madi-
son River's motive was protection of its market power) (available via FCC Electronic
Comment Filing System) with Comments ofAT&T, supra note 11 at 41 (explaining the le-
gitimate need for network management to cope with changes in the marketplace).
230 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 5, 1 23, n.240.
231 See discussion supra Part II.
232 Comcast MO&O, supra note 9, 1.
233 Net Neutrality Groups Ask FCC to Prohibit P2P Blocking, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY,
Nov. 2, 2007, available at LEXIS, Load-Date Nov. 2, 2007.
234 Id.
235 Comcast MO&O, supra note 9, 1 1.
236 Id
237 Id
238 Id
542 [Vol. 19
2011] A Data-Driven Alternative for Open Internet Regulation
losses.239 Nevertheless, the FCC concluded that Comcast's actions were a vio-
lation of its Internet Policy Statement (despite that the Internet Policy State-
ment is not law). 240 The Order, however, was only effective in memorializing
the case, because by the time the Order was released, Comcast had already
agreed to cease blocking Bittorrent.241
Two elements of this case garner the most attention. First, there are the op-
tics of Comcast's actions: Comcast initially denied the nature of its network
management practices, then equivocated, then finally admitted to sending reset
packets.242 Comcast's conduct implied that it was hiding its network manage-
ment practices because it believed that if customers knew about them, they
would perhaps not use Comcast's service.243 Second, even if Comcast's chosen
network management methods were technically sound,2" they give the impres-
sion that Comcast knew that its actions would not be well-received if discov-
ered.
Why did Comcast choose to degrade Bittorrent communications despite the
potential ramifications? Net neutrality advocates would infer that Comcast was
attempting to be anti-competitive or anti-consumer, but there are other, equally
plausible explanations.2 45 For example, the argument that P2P traffic degrades
the experience for other users sharing a network is technically accurate.' To
reduce customer complaints and improve overall speeds, it would be necessary
239 Networks Defend Traffic Management Practices, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Feb. 14,
2008, available at LEXIS, Load-Date Feb. 14, 2008.
240 Comcast MO&O, supra note 9, 1.
241 Comcast MO&O, supra note 9, 1; FCC Continues to Probe Comcast Broadband
Network Management, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Mar. 28, 2008, available at LEXIS, Load-
Date Mar. 27, 2008.
242 Compare Comcast Accused of Limiting BitTorrent Traffic, COMMUNICATIONs DAILY,
Aug. 21, 2007, available at LEXIS, Load-Date Aug. 20, 2007 (Comcast denying allegations
of network management) with Martin Urges "Transparent" Broadband Network Manage-
ment, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Feb. 26, 2008, available at LEXIS, Load-Date Feb. 25,
2008 (Comcast admitting some level of network management).
243 Id. ("The catch to Cohen's comments is that studies show that when a network is
delayed, people will stop using it, said Marvin Ammori, Free Press general counsel.").
244 See supra Part III.B.
245 In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Cor-
poration for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications; Broadband Industry Practices
Petition of Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling that Degrading an Internet Application
Violates the FCC's Internet Policy Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for "Rea-
sonable Network Management," Petition for Declaratory Ruling of Free Press, et al., File
No. EB-08-IH-1518, WC Docket No. 07-52 (Nov. 1, 2007) (available via FCC Electronic
Comment Filing System).
246 FCC Gives Comcast 30 Days to File Plan to End P2P Traffic-Shaping, COMMUNICA-
TIONs DAILY, Aug. 21, 2008, available at LEXIS, Load-Date Aug. 20, 2008 (the FCC ac-
knowledged in the Order that a small number of users use a disproportionately large amount
of bandwidth).
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to cut down on P2P traffic that overburdens some portion of the network.2 47
Additionally, the argument that Comcast is being anti-competitive begs the
question: to whom? Blocking Bittorrent traffic could cause users to abandon
Bittorrent as a protocol.248 But Comcast is an ISP, not a software provider.2 49
Since neither company directly competes with the other, Comcast's motive to
block Bittorrent to improve its position in its own marketplace is unclear.
3. Chin v. RCN(2008-2010)
In August 2008, Sabrina Chin sued RCN Corporation ("RCN"), a cable
company, for violating the Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act,250 as well as vari-
ous state laws.25' She alleged that RCN had falsely represented to consumers
that "it provided 'uncapped' broadband Internet service that was fast, when, in
fact, it engaged in certain network management practices that blocked and
slowed service."252 After discovery, during which Chin hired an expert from
the EFF to determine whether RCN was blocking certain Internet traffic, 253 the
parties entered into settlement negotiations that resulted in RCN acceding to
conditions that, inter alia, prevented it from blocking P2P and non-P2P proto-
cols.254
Net neutrality advocates point to this case as an example of harmful network
management practices. 255 Taken with the Comcast case, Chin v. RCN appears
to establish that ISPs are engaged in a pattern and practice of blocking or de-
grading certain Internet traffic for anti-consumer and anti-competitive reasons.
However, Chin v. RCN offers very little insight into RCN's network manage-
ment practices and motives, let alone those of ISPs generally, because the case
was not resolved on the merits.256 Whatever information was obtained in dis-
covery has been obscured from public view; moreover, RCN never admitted to
247 Ou, supra note 6, at 15-16 (explaining how peer-to-peer file transfers can burden
networks).
248 Open Internet Order, supra note 4, 28 n.82 (noting that broadband providers can
discourage demand by blocking end user access to edge providers).
249 See The XFINITY Triple Play from Comcast, COMCAST,
http://www.comcast.com/Corporate/Learn/Bundles/bundles.html (last visited May 14,
2011).
250 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
251 The case later became a class action lawsuit. Chin v. RCN Corp., 08 Civ. 7349
(RJS)(KNF), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31272, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2010).
252 Id. at *2-3.
253 Id. at *2-3.
254 Id. at *4-5.
255 See, e.g., Reply Comments ofFree Press, supra note 149, at 2-3.
256 As explained, the case was settled and RCN denied wrongdoing. Chin v. RCN Corp.,
08 Civ. 7349 (RJS)(KNF), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96302, at *16-17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8,
2010).
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any wrongdoing. 257 Thus, to hold this out as an example of network manage-
ment practices gone wrong is to elevate an allegation to a conclusion with re-
spect to RCN's motives.
Collectively, these three occurrences give rise to at least some cause for
concern. 258 The question is whether they establish a need for government inter-
vention to prevent future harm from rogue network management practices. 259
The answer is unclear; unfortunately, even where blocking or degradation has
been established, the motives behind it do not appear to be well established
enough that they counsel in favor of government regulation. Interestingly, the-
se case studies share the common theme that government intervention did
nothing to identify the issue in the first place. Instead, individual consumers
and consumer advocate groups brought the initial pressure against ISPs to
change their practices. 260 Their knowledge that these practices exist and their
apparent willingness to be vigilant in monitoring for them counsels against
moving forward with a formal regulatory structure.
Convergence further complicates efforts at precisely identifying telecom-
munications provider incentives to block or degrade network traffic. Tele-
communications providers offer multiple types of service, most commonly
"triple-play" packages that bundle voice, video and Internet access.2 1' The reg-
ulatory regimes for each of these services are complicated enough; now that
they are becoming less distinguishable, regulators and the market are strug-
gling to catch up. 262 For example, the merger between Comcast and NBC Uni-
versal sparked debate about the proper way to characterize "online video dis-
tributors," such as Hulu, which use Internet protocol to deliver program-
ming.263 Are such Online Video Distribution providers merely a complemen-
257 Open Internet Order, supra note 4, 36 n.1 10.
258 Id. % 36-37.
259 Id. 1 21 (outlining three types of incentives the FCC believes that broadband service
providers have to limit openness of the Internet).
260 In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Cor-
poration for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications; Broadband Industry Practices
Petition of Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling that Degrading an Internet Application
Violates the FCC's Internet Policy Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for "Rea-
sonable Network Management," Petition for Declaratory Ruling of Free Press, et al., File
No. EB-08-IH-1518, WC Docket No. 07-52 (Nov. 1, 2007).
261 See COMCAST, supra note 249.
262 For example, a variety of new online services have recently been released that break
down traditional barriers between media, such as Time Warner Cable's iPad application that
allows live television to be streamed to the iPad, and the "HBO Go" service, which allows
current HBO subscribers to watch fairly recent HBO content. TWCable TV for iPad, TIME
WARNER CABLE,
http://www.timewamercable.com/nynj/learn/cable/TWCableTV/TWCableTV-iPad.html
(last visited May 14, 2011); HBOGo, HBO, http://www.hbogo.com/ (last visited May 14,
2011).
263 In re Applications of Comcast Corp., General Electric Co., and NBC Universal, Inc.
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tary service to traditional cable pay-TV, or are they direct competitors? The
answer to these questions is non-trivial, because it dictates the competitive re-
lationship between incumbent pay-TV services and new entrants to the market,
and thus the FCC's attitude toward market regulation.2" Some wireline-centric
companies, like Cox Communications, are now aggressively entering into the
wireless telecommunications market as well.265 Some traditional pay-TV-
centric service providers are moving into the market for Internet-based applica-
tions. A recent example is Time Warner Cable, which has developed an iPad
application that enables its customers to stream, within the home, full cable
television channels to the iPad. 66 Thus, competition is expanding both hori-
zontally and vertically within the telecommunications market.
Network management pervades this Gordian knot. As discussed above,
some level of network management must exist for the Internet to operate prop-
erly, and for ISPs to remain competitive.267 The FCC has avoided answering
how much network management is reasonable by promulgating rules that rely
on case-by-case adjudication to refine, over time, what constitutes reasonable
network management.2 68 Although this strategy is sound-assuming it survives
judicial review-the FCC would better serve the industry if it were to adopt a
mandatory information collection to enable it to more effectively monitor the
complex relationships it is attempting to regulate. Not only would this give the
FCC an affirmative view of the industry landscape, rather than relying on third
party reports, it would also assist in resolving any future complaints by giving
the FCC a framework for analysis.
D. Application of the Transparency Principle
One of the major problems the FCC faces is determining when and how a
violation of open Internet rules has taken place.269 The FCC has recognized that
"sunlight is the best disinfectant."270 It has also recognized that "only a manda-
tory and systematic collection of local competition and broadband deployment
For Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licenses, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 25 F.C.C.R. 4238, T 63-66 (Jan. 18, 2011).
264 See id. $T 87-90 (adopting conditions mitigating the potential harm Comcast could
cause competing OVDs).
265 Cox Launches Wireless in New England, Cleveland, COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY
(May 17, 2011), http://www.cable360.net/ct/news/thewire/46420.html.
266 TIME WARNER CABLE, supra note 262.
267 See supra Part III.B.
268 Open Internet Order, supra note 4, TT 152-60 (describing the complaint enforcement
process).
269 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 5, 1 124 ("In the absence of disclosure rules, we
have no way of knowing the full extent of these practices. Nor do users.").
270 Id. 118.
546 [Vol. 19
2011] A Data-Driven Alternative for Open Internet Regulation
information will provide the comprehensive and consistent set of data [re-
quired] to carry out our statutory mandates." 271
Of course, the Open Internet Order attempts to address transparency. 272
However, two problems become immediately apparent from the plain language
of the rules: they do not require broadband ISPs to disclose the precise details
of their network management practices, nor do they require sufficient detail to
give third parties the information they need to monitor ISP behavior.273
ISPs describe their network management practices in very general terms.274
The transparency rule of the Open Internet Order is probably broad enough
that ISPs would not have to commit to substantive changes to those descrip-
tions. The generality or specificity of ISPs' disclosures would hinge on their
discretion, resulting in inconsistencies that could be unhelpful to both consum-
ers and the FCC. Subtle distinctions in the way that ISPs report information
will make it more difficult for consumers to compare services, and more diffi-
cult for the FCC or third party investigators to determine whether a violation is
taking place.
The second problem is a corollary of the first. One of the central purposes of
the transparency rule is to enable network monitoring so that third parties can
bring complaints to the Commission. But this presupposes that third parties can
collect enough information to make a case. This means that broadband ISPs,
which have the greatest knowledge of their own networks, have the advantage
in any such complaint.
This Comment takes the position that the case studies described above do
not amount to enough evidence to conclude that regulation in the form of open
Internet rules is necessary in the first place, not to mention the potential juris-
271 In re Local Competition and Broadband Reporting, Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R.
7717, 18 (Mar. 24, 2000). In fact, the FCC has acted to modify Form 477 to include more
data about broadband deployment by issuing an NPRM. In contrast to this Comment's pro-
posal, however, the FCC appears to be focused on collecting data about the speed of broad-
band services, their scope of deployment, and consumer satisfaction with their service. None
of those categories would provide direct evidence of broadband providers' network man-
agement practices. See In re Modernizing the FCC Form 477 Data Program; Development
of Nationwide Broadband Data to Evaluate Reasonable and Timely Deployment of Ad-
vanced Services to All Americans, Improvement of Wireless Broadband Subscribership
Data, and Development of Data on Interconnected Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) Sub-
scribership; Service Quality, Customer Satisfaction, Infrastructure and Operating Data
Gathering; Review of Wireline Competition Bureau Data Practices, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 26 F.C.C.R. 1508, f 47-106 (Feb. 8, 2011) (outlining the various types of
information that could be collected) [hereinafter Form 477 NPRMJ.
272 Open Internet Order, supra note 4, 1 53.
273 Id. T 54 ("[a] person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service
shall publicly disclose accurate information . . . sufficient for consumers to make informed
choices regarding use of such services" (emphasis added)).
274 See infra notes 281-82 (describing the different ways in which Cox and Comcast
disclose their network management practices).
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dictional issues. Should the opportunity arise to modify the rules, or should
they be vacated, this Comment's solution provides a way for the Commission
to move forward confidently.
The Commission should keep itself abreast of developments in the broad-
band industry by instituting a mandatory information collection, which asks the
same questions of all broadband ISPs, wireline and wireless. The Commission
should make this data publicly available insofar as business-related confiden-
tially concerns will allow.275 An information collection is the Goldilocks solu-
tion: not as extreme as either reclassification or inaction, but just the right fit.276
In doing this, the Commission may arm itself with valuable data for future
regulatory proceedings, complaints, and congressional action. Indeed, it al-
ready recognizes the value of ongoing information collection in other con-
texts.277 For example, the Commission reports annually on the state of competi-
tion in the mobile phone industry in order to make adjustments to its regulatory
response over time,278 collects information on broadband and telephone line
deployment through Form 477,279 and regularly reviews its media ownership
rules.280 In the same way, it should continuously review the state of network
management practices.
Moreover, an information collection regime managed by the Commission
would create consistency in the reporting of broadband network management
practices. Currently, different providers highlight different information about
their networks.28 Where consumers have the choice among multiple providers,
275 See infra Part Ill.E.
276 See infra Part III.E.
277 See Form 477 NPRM supra note 271.
278 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1)(C) (2006) (requiring the Commission to promulgate an annual
report on CMRS competition).
279 In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capabil-
ity to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate
Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as
Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, Seventh Broadband Deployment Notice
of Inquiry, GN Docket No. 10-159, 1 14 n.41 (Aug. 6, 2010) [hereinafter Broadband De-
ployment NOI]. In fact, the FCC has instituted a proceeding to examine how Form 477
could be improved. Form 477 NPRM, supra note 271.
280 47 U.S.C. § 303 note; see also In re 2010 Quadrennial Regulatory Review - Review
of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to
Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 25 F.C.C.R. 6086, l n.2 (May 25,
2010) (discussing the Commission's statutory mandate to review its rules).
281 For example, Cox provides a list of the maximum amount of data a consumer can use
based on the different packages of service Cox offers. Features and Limits of Service, Cox
(July 1, 2010), http://ww2.cox.com/aboutus/northemvirginia/policies/limitations.cox. How-
ever, Cox does not make this page readily accessible-it provides links not in its main navi-
gation panels but within the text of the terms of service where consumers are less likely to
find it. See Cox Communications Policies, Cox,
http://ww2.cox.com/aboutus/northemvirginia/policies.cox (last visited May 14, 2011).
Comcast explains its data usage policies in greater detail, including a more prolonged expla-
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this smorgasbord of information does not facilitate accurate comparisons.28
Were the FCC to consolidate and publish information on its website, however,
comparisons would be much more straightforward.283 The Commission could
benefit from uniform data collection as well, perhaps leveraging it to publish
an annual or semi-annual report in the same manner as, for example, the
CMRS reports.284
E. Format of an Information Collection
This Comment's proposed information collection would have two compo-
nents, both of which would become part of the existing Form 477.285 First,
Form 477 already collects information on a semi-annual basis, and this would
not be changed to prevent undue administrative burden to filers.286 Instead,
additional questions targeting network management practices would be incor-
porated into the existing form.287 Second, a separate, abbreviated form would
be designed to enable broadband ISPs to report changes to their network man-
agement practices within about a week of occurrence.288
nation of its rationale for implementing those policies, although it does not give any more
technical detail than does Cox. See Frequently Asked Questions About Excessive Use, COM-
CAST, http://customer.comcast.com/Pages/FAQViewer.aspx?seoid=Frequently-Asked-
Questions-about-Excessive-Use#excessive (last visited May 14, 2011); COMCAST, COMCAST
ACCEPTABLE USE POLICY FOR HIGH-SPEED INTERNET SERVICES (2009),
http://www.comcast.com/MediaLibrary/l/l/Customers/Customer Support/Legal/Acceptabl
e Use Policyfor Intemet.pdf.
282 For example, neither Comcast nor Cox incorporate network management information
into their promotional materials. See High-Speed Internet, COMCAST,
http://www.comcast.com/Corporate/Learn/HighSpeedlntemet/highspeedinternet.html (last
visited May 14, 2011); High Speed Internet, Cox,
http://ww2.cox.com/residential/northernvirginia/intemet.cox (last visited May 14, 2011).
Ofcom has explicitly stated that consumers face significant challenges when they attempt to
determine how network management impacts their Internet experience precisely because
there is a lack of transparency on the part of broadband ISPs. Traffic Management and "Net
Neutrality ", OFCOM, 34 (2010), http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/net-
neutrality/summary/netneutrality.pdf.
283 The Commission has already taken steps to put information in a consumer-friendly,
comparable format. See, e.g., FCC.gov/Data, FCC, http://reboot.fcc.gov/data (last visited
May 14, 2011).
284 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1)(C) (2006) (requiring the Commission to promulgate an annual
report on CMRS competition).
285 Arguably, giving a network management information collection requirement its own
form would be the ideal solution. However, as explained below, modifying Form 477 likely
gives the Commission more firm legal authority to implement it, and, more importantly,
make it mandatory. Infra discussion Part IV.
286 Broadband Deployment NO1, supra note 279, 14 n.4 1.
287 Infra discussion Part III.E.
288 Forms that amend or update information previously submitted to the Commission are
common. See, e.g., FCC 317 Instructions for Annual DTVAncillary/Supplementary Services
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1. Addendum to Form 477
The additional questions incorporated into Form 477 would be divided into
three categories289 that parallel those suggested by the Commission in the Open
Internet Order: network openness (capturing the four original principles articu-
lated in the Internet Policy Statement),29 o nondiscrimination,29' and transpar-
ency measures.292
a. Network Openness
This section of the form would ask questions related to broadband ISPs'
network management practices that might restrict consumers' ability to access
content, applications, services, devices, or that could impede competition.293
Suggested questions are the following:294
(1) Please list the platform(s) over which you provide broadband Internet services
(e.g., DOCSIS 3.0, LTE) and describe the QoS techniques you use to regulate
them.2 9 5 Do you use network management techniques based on data rate restric-
tions or prioritization? 296 Are those measures subjective (i.e., based on policy) or
objective (i.e., based on mathematical analysis)?
(2) Please describe the network management rules 29 7 that are applied to each and eve-
ry one of your customers, regardless of the nature (i.e., the duration, price, or tier)
of their subscription and their prior data usage history.298
Report, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/Forms/Form3l7/317.pdf (last visited May 14, 2011).
289 On the actual form, these questions may be divided however it is administratively
convenient for the Commission. For the purposes of outlining these questions here, it is
useful to divide them into categories.
290 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 5, 92.
291 Id. 104; Comments of Free Press, supra note 7, at 59-60.
292 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 5, T 119.
293 Id. $ 92.
294 These questions are not intended to be comprehensive; if the FCC were to adopt such
an information collection, it would need to appropriately tailor the information collection to
the FCC's, consumers', and ISPs' needs.
295 See generally Matt Tooley and Don Bowman, An Overview of the DOCSIS (Cable
Internet) Platform, SANDVINE INTELLIGENT BROADBAND NETWORKS, 19 (2010), available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020374671 (describing in detail the DOC-
SIS platform) [hereinafter SANDVINE COMMENTS].
296 See generally SANDVINE COMMENTS, supra note 295 (noting two overarching ap-
proaches to network management).
297 Here, the word "rules" is used to describe the "if-then" conditions that trigger net-
work management practices. Broadband ISPs should not be asked to submit technical doc-
uments describing the operation of the software. Infra Part III(F).
298 This question is designed to enable the Commission and consumers to compare ap-
ples to apples. Without establishing baseline network management practices that are widely
established throughout the broadband Internet provider industry, neither the Commission
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(3) Is there a hard limit, or cap, on the amount of data customers can use? 299 If So,
what is that hard cap (in megabytes or gigabytes)? Does the cap apply to a particu-
lar data plan? If so, please list those plans that have caps and provide references. If
not, please describe how the cap is applied to the end-user.
(4) Is there a "soft cap" which, when customers exceed a particular value of data con-
sumed, their broadband connection's capacity is reduced? 3 If so, what is that soft
cap (in megabytes or gigabytes)? To what data rate is the customer's connection
reduced after he or she exceeds the soft cap? Does the cap apply to a particular da-
ta plan? If so, please list those plans that have caps. If not, please describe how the
cap is applied to the customer.
(5) Have you entered into any mutual agreements with ISPs, content delivery net-
works ("CDNs"), or other telecommunications entities that have provisions that
affect the way you manage your networks?301
(6) Do you perform deep packet inspection ("DPI"), or otherwise examine at the con-
tent of your customers' data traffic for the purpose of managing your network? 302
Why or why not?
b. Nondiscrimination
Questions in this section of the form would relate to broadband ISPs' net-
work management practices that might treat consumers, content providers, oth-
nor consumers can understand whether a particular network management practice is truly
reasonable. In this regard, Ofcom's voluntary Code of Practice on Broadband Speeds en-
courages ISPs to publish broad information on the restrictions applied to applications, ser-
vices and protocols on their networks. Traffic Management and "Net Neutrality", OFCOM,
38 (2010), http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/net-
neutrality/summary/netneutrality.pdf.
299 See Features and Limits of Service, Cox (July 1, 2010),
http://ww2.cox.com/aboutus/northemvirginia/policies/limitations.cox. Note that Cox does
not detail what occurs to the broadband customer's connection should he or she exceed the
limit specified in the chart Cox provides. Features and Limits of Service, Cox (July 1,
2010), http://ww2.cox.com/aboutus/northemvirginia/policies/limitations.cox.
300 Id.
301 This question is designed to reveal whether contractual arrangements are governing
the use of particular network management techniques; in other words, to reveal arrange-
ments for paid prioritization. See Comments of Free Press, supra note 7, at 15-23 (discuss-
ing broadband ISP incentives to implement paid prioritization); See also In re Applications
of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company and NBC Universal Inc. For Consent to
Assign Licenses or Transfer Control of Licensees, Petition to Condition or Deny of Earth-
link, Inc., MB Docket No. 10-56, at 51 (Jun. 21, 2010) (proposing that the merger be condi-
tioned on Comcast offering a broadband wholesale access service to prevent Comcast from
discriminating against content providers and consumers).
302 Sandvine, a global company that provides network management solutions, notes that
DPI could be considered a necessary element of any network management solution because
sophisticated applications may themselves attempt to hide their activities from the network
to circumvent restrictions. See SANDVINE COMMENTS, supra note 295.
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er broadband ISPs, and/or applications, services and devices differently.3 03
Suggested questions include the following:
(1) Are there software applications or devices whose use by customers trigers net-
work management rules that operate differently than the default rules? 0 If so,
please list those applications, describe the network management rules that apply to
each of them, and explain why those applications merit different treatment.
(2) Are customers charged a different price per amount of data consumed after they
have exceeded hard or soft caps?30 If so, what are those rates? Does exceeding
those caps trigger different network management practices?
(3) Do you offer different tiers of service? 306 What are those tiers, to whom are they
marketed, and what do they cost?
(4) Do you provide managed services over your customers' Internet connectivity ser-
vice?30 If so, describe these offerings. For example, are there particular classes of
users that receive differential treatment based on their bandwidth, QoS needs,
and/or subscription to particular services that require a more robust delivery
mechanism than best-effort delivery?
c. Transparency to Consumers
This section of the form would ask questions related to how broadband ISPs
inform their customers about their network management practices. Suggested
questions include the following:
(1) List the means by which you inform your customers of your network management
practices (e.g., website, customer service representative, etc.).308 If you provide no
303 This Comment does not suggest that there should be a presumption that differential
treatment should automatically be presumed to be equivalent to discriminatory treatment.
Open Internet Order, supra note 4, 39.
30 For example, does the use of Bittorrent trigger network management rules applied
only to the Bittorrent user's connection?
30s Wireless broadband ISPs, for example, charge overage rates when customers exceed
pre-defined data usage limits. See, e.g., DataConnect Plans, AT&T,
http://www.wireless.att.com/cell-phone-service/cell-phone-plans/data-connect-plans.jsp
(last visited May 14, 2011) (listing overage charges for data usage beyond 200MB or 5GB).
306 Currently many providers of both wired and wireless broadband service offer differ-
ent levels or tiers of service based on the speed of the service. Cox, for example, provides
four different packages of broadband Internet service, ranging from 3Mbps download to
50Mbps download. High Speed Internet, Cox,
http://ww2.cox.com/residential/northernvirginia/intemet.cox (last visited May 14, 2011).
307 Managed services for the purposes of collecting data can be defined as "better than
'best-effort' delivery." See Marcus Weldon, Managed Services Declaration, 1 (Jan. 14,
2010), attached to Open Internet Comments of TIA, supra note 6.
30s This section of the addendum is designed to establish whether and how broadband
ISPs communicate with their customers to let them know the limitations of their service. See
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such information to your customers, please state why not.
(2) Have any customers filed complaints related to your network management prac-
tices? If so, how many complaints were there since you last filed, and what pro-
portion of the total number of complaints you have received do they constitute? 309
2. The Abbreviated Form
A fundamental conflict exists between the FCC's limited resources and the
rapid pace of Internet innovation. FCC reports published annually or semi-
annually are not likely to be able to match that pace, so broadband ISPs should
be required to file updates with the Commission describing only changes to (1)
hard or soft caps, (2) to overage charges for exceeding hard or soft caps, and
(3) to systemic changes in network management rules within one week of
those changes taking place.3
F. Maintaining Broadband ISP Confidentiality
Some of the answers to these questions potentially depend on the submis-
sion of information that maps the contours of a broadband ISP's network."'
One of the most obvious problems related to such specific disclosure is secu-
rity for both the broadband ISPs and their customers.312 The Commission has
Traffic Management and "Net Neutrality", OFcOM, 35-36 (2010),
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/net-
neutrality/summary/netneutrality.pdf (noting that "[w]e believe that a lack of transparency
around traffic management may already be emerging as an issue for customers").
309 These questions are designed to provide the Commission, in particular, with an em-
pirical-if imprecise-way to measure whether customers are being personally affected by
network management practices. Traffic Management and "Net Neutrality", OFCoM, 35-36
(2010), http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/net-
neutrality/summary/netneutrality.pdf.
310 Supra Part III.E.1 (elaborating on rationales for each of these questions). The third
proposed requirement deliberately uses the word "systemic" in order to differentiate be-
tween network management employed automatically (i.e., without human intervention), and
the rules created to govern those systems. It would be absurd to require a formal notification
to the Commission every time the rules were changed, because computer systems could be
programmed to make slight changes to the rules within certain parameters in order to adapt
to specific problems without changing the substantive effect of the rules. Therefore, broad-
band ISPs should be required to file only when the structure of their network management
rules is changed. For example, if network computers were to determine that a customer
needs more upload bandwidth and allocates another 6 MHz channel to that user to accom-
modate that need, no filing would be required. On the other hand, if a network engineer
were to change the total amount of upload bandwidth the network computers are allowed to
allocate to a customer, a filing would be required.
311 Supra Part Il.E.1.
312 In re Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, Comments ofCom-
cast Corp., GN Docket No. 09-191, 46-50 (Jan. 14, 2010),
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recognized this issue with respect to broadband data collection, because it ag-
gregates Form 477 data to anonymize the business data submitted by filing
parties.' Anonymizing data has the drawback of reducing transparency, how-
ever, so it must be used with caution.3 14 Were the Commission to impose a data
collection requirement related to open Internet rules, the default assumption
should be that all data submitted would be publicly available, unless filing par-
ties request confidentiality through the Commission's existing mechanisms."'
Public availability would allow not only the FCC to make use of the data, but
consumers also."' The Commission could thus serve an important public ser-
vice function by organizing the data to enable the public to compare broadband
ISPs' network management practices simply by comparing responses across
each question.3"
IV. THE FCC'S AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT A MANDATORY
INFORMATION COLLECTION
An information collection regime will be effective so long as the Commis-
sion mandates that broadband ISPs submit answers to a uniform questionnaire.
Otherwise, broadband ISPs have an incentive to choose a response format that
favors their position, creating inconsistencies that would lessen the usefulness
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020375772.
313 Internet Access Services: Status as of June 30, 2009, INDUS. ANALYSIS AND TECH.
Div., FCC, I & n.l (Sept. 2010),
http://www.fcc.gov/DailyReleases/DailyBusiness/2010/db09O2/DOC-301294Al.pdf.
314 Nowhere in the latest broadband deployment report does the FCC refer to a specific
broadband ISP. See generally id. Therefore, this data cannot be used to compare broadband
ISPs.
315 47 C.F.R. § 0.457(d)(2) (2009) (describing protections that the FCC places on records
submitted pursuant to confidentiality requests based on 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) and 47 C.F.R.
§ 0.459); 47 C.F.R. § 0.459 (2009) (describing the procedure for submission of confidential
information); 47 C.F.R. § 0.461 (2009) (describing the procedure for third party requests of
sensitive information pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act); 47 C.F.R. § 1.7001(d)
(2009) (handling requests for non-disclosure of sensitive data except to certain state enti-
ties); 47 C.F.R. § 43.11(c) (2009); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2006) (trade secrets are not made
routinely available to the public). See also In re Examination of the Current Policy Concern-
ing the Treatment of Confidential Information Submitted to the Commission, Report and
Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 24,816 (July 29, 1998).
316 The Commission's existing filing systems, for example, enable public searches. See,
e.g., Universal Licensing System - License Search, FCC,
http://wireless2.fcc.gov/UlsAppIUlsSearch/searchLicense.jsp (last visited May 14, 2011).
317 The FCC has recently created new tools to harness existing data to enable better pub-
lic disclosure. Paul de Sa, FCC Reform: Data, http://reboot.fcc.gov/reform/data (last visited
May 14, 2011) ("Data underpins every activity at the Federal Communications Commission.
By better involving data in open and transparent rule-making, the FCC can better serve the
public while enabling public innovation. The FCC has long published relevant data, though
the process of improving its quality, openness, accessibility, and utility warrants continuous
progress.").
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of the data to the Commission and the public."' This section outlines the
Commission's authority to make such information collection mandatory.
A. Piggybacking on Existing Authority
One of the strongest advantages of an information collection requirement is
that it would not require the FCC to navigate difficult jurisdictional argu-
ments."' By folding questions that probe network management practices into
the existing Form 477, the statutory framework on which Form 477 relies
could be extended to support those questions as well. Specifically, Form 477
uses section 706 of the 1996 Act to justify the Commission's authority.320
When the Broadband Data Improvement Act ("BDIA") was passed in 2009, 47
U.S.C. § 157 note was re-codified as 47 U.S.C. § 1302.321 Section 1302(a)
reads:
The Commission and each State commission with regulatory jurisdiction
over telecommunications services shall encourage the deployment on a reason-
able and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Ameri-
cans (including, in particular, elementary and secondary schools and class-
rooms) by utilizing, in a manner consistent with the public interest, conven-
ience, and necessity, price cap regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures
that promote competition in the local telecommunications market, or other reg-
ulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment.322
An information collection requirement for network management practices
would give effect to this language by better enabling the FCC to understand the
state of competition in the broadband market and would allow it to more effec-
tively carry out its goal of widespread broadband deployment.323 The FCC has
explicitly recognized the advantage of an information collection program in the
context of broadband deployment:
[An] information collection program will also enable us to better assess the
availability of broadband services such as high-speed Internet access, so that
we can better satisfy our duty to encourage the deployment of advanced tele-
communications capability as Congress directed us to do in section 706 of the
318 See discussion supra note 273.
3'9 See Comcast, 600 F.3d at 659 ("We readily accept that certain assertions of Commis-
sion authority could be 'reasonably ancillary' to the Commission's statutory responsibility
to issue a report to Congress. For example, the Commission might impose disclosure re-
quirements on regulated entities in order to gather data needed for such a report.").
320 Broadband Deployment NO1, supra note 279, 1 1 n. 1.
321 Id.
322 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (Supp. III 2006).
323 In re Local Competition and Broadband Reporting, Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R.
7717, 3 (Mar. 24, 2000) ("this information collection program will also enable us to better
access the availability of broadband service such as high-speed Internet access").
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1996 Act.324
Competitor ISPs would be able to see this data as well.325 This transparency
promotes competition by enabling broadband ISPs to monitor and react to their
competitors' moves with respect to network management.
The FCC could initiate a rulemaking to modify section 1.7000 of its rules326
to include questions within the existing Form 477 information collection to
address broadband ISPs' implementation of network management practices.327
As demonstrated above, network management and network efficiency are
wholly intertwined.328 Without information on network management, the FCC
cannot assess the services offered to consumers, which means that the FCC
cannot monitor the progress of broadband deployment in the United States. 2 1
The language of the statute (specifically, subsection (b)) is directly on point: 330
The Commission shall, within 30 months after the date of enactment of this
Act [enacted Oct. 10, 2008], and annually thereafter, initiate a notice of inquiry
concerning the availability of advanced telecommunications capability to all
Americans.... In the inquiry, the Commission shall determine whether ad-
vanced telecommunications capability is being deployed to all Americans in a
reasonable and timely fashion.1'
Section 1302(b) supports ongoing Commission data collection to determine
whether broadband is being widely deployed.332 The latest Commission report
on the state of broadband was released in September 2010, and Commission
has maintained ongoing Form 477 collection efforts. 333
Apart from jurisdictional arguments tied to Form 477, the FCC may have an
324 In re Local Competition and Broadband Reporting, Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R.
7717, 13 (Mar. 24, 2000).
325 The FCC publishes a web page listing its broadband reports based on Form 477. Lo-
cal Telephone Competition and Broadband Deployment, FCC,
http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/iatd/comp.html (last visited May 14, 2011). Presumably, network
management data, if implemented via Form 477, would be reported in this listing.
326 47 C.F.R. § 1.7000 (2010) et seq.
327 47 C.F.R. § 1.411 (2010).
328 See discussion supra Part III.A-B.
329 See Broadband Deployment NOI, supra note 279, 3 (Aug. 6, 2010) ("[tihe ultimate
purpose of this Inquiry is to inform ourselves about the state of broadband deployment and
its progress so that we can consider what additional actions, if any, should or should not be
taken by the Commission to bring broadband to all Americans").
330 Instructions for Local Telephone Competition and Broadband Reporting (FCC Form
477), FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/Forms/Form477/477inst.pdf (last visited May 14, 2011).
331 47 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (Supp. III 2006).
332 47 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (Supp. III 2006).
333 See generally In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommuni-
cations Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible
Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, as Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, Seventh Broadband
Deployment Notice ofInquiry, GN Docket No. 10-159 (Aug. 6, 2010).
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argument that an information collection is valid on ancillary authority. The
Comcast court, speaking in the context of section 257,33 said that ancillary
authority might allow the Commission to "gather data needed for such a re-
port."335 In contrast, only affirmative regulation would violate the boundaries
of ancillary authority.' Since this Comment suggests an information collec-
tion based on an existing, and ongoing, Commission obligation, as opposed to
positive regulation, there is a possibility that the Commission could cite ancil-
lary authority to bolster the authority it wields under section 706.
B. Enforcement Authority
To give the information collection some teeth, the Commission must also be
able to levy penalties against noncompliant entities. Fortunately, that authority
has been articulated before in the context of the original Form 477 data collec-
tion."
Here, the Commission's primary enforcement authority is derived from 47
U.S.C. § 502, which prohibits "knowing and willful" violations of any "rule,
regulation, restriction, or condition made or imposed by the Commission under
authority of this Act."338 Assuredly, an information collection designed pursu-
ant to a congressional mandate falls within the Commission's authority.339 Sec-
tion 502 lays the groundwork for Commission enforcement authority.340 Sec-
tion 503 takes the next step, permitting forfeitures against persons who have
"willfully or repeatedly" failed to comply with regulations promulgated under
the 1934 Act.341 Section 403 enables the Commission to begin an enforcement
334 Section 257 is an ongoing, Congressionally-mandated report on the effect of regula-
tion on market entry barriers. 47 U.S.C. § 257(c).
335 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 659.
336 See Comcast, 600 F.3d at 659-60 ("But the Commission's attempt to dictate the op-
eration of an otherwise unregulated service based on nothing more than its obligation to
issue a report defies any plausible notion of 'ancillariness."').
337 In re Local Competition and Broadband Reporting, Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R.
7717, 22 (Mar. 24, 2000).
338 47 U.S.C. § 502 (2006) ("Any person who willfully and knowingly violates any rule,
regulation, restriction, or condition made or imposed by the Commission under authority of
this Act... shall, in addition to any other penalties provided by law, be punished, upon con-
viction thereof, by a fine").
339 In re Local Competition and Broadband Reporting, Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R.
7717, 105 (Mar. 24, 2000) ("Moreover, we note that the Commission has authority pursu-
ant to sections 502 and 503 of the Act to enforce compliance with its rules by fine or forfei-
ture.").
340 47 U.S.C. § 502 (2006) ("Any person who willfully and knowingly violates any rule,
regulation, restriction, or condition made or imposed by the Commission under authority of
this Act . . . shall, in addition to any other penalties provided by law, be punished, upon
conviction thereof, by a fine").
341 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) ("Any person who is determined by the Commission, in accor-
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proceeding on its own motion.342 Finally, 47 C.F.R. § 7001(f) explicitly puts
broadband ISPs on notice that failure to file Form 477 may lead to an enforce-
ment action under the above-stated statutes and rules.3 43 Collectively, these
provisions would enable the Commission to back a network management in-
formation collection with penalties that would ensure compliance.
V. CONCLUSION
The Commission finds itself in a difficult position.3" On the one hand, it
recognizes that there may be a future need to regulate broadband ISPs to pre-
vent a nascent, but looming, harm.4 On the other, it is experiencing uncer-
tainty with respect to the method and authority it should use in order to reassert
itself.
Fundamentally, this Comment's proposed solution is a compromise among
the several powerful interests that shape the open Internet debate. Although it
is likely not the robust solution that the Commission would like to adopt, it
does provide a way to move forward without triggering the regulatory difficul-
ties that arise from classifying components of Internet service into either the
telecommunications or information services silos.346 From the public interest
stakeholders' perspective, it may not be strong enough, at least in the near
term, because it does not explicitly solve the immediate problem they perceive.
And from the broadband ISPs' perspective, it adds yet another layer of report-
ing requirements.347
Nonetheless, the importance of broadband communications to our economy
mandates action so that these interests may be balanced and the public interest
may be served. The author hopes that this Comment at least advances the de-
bate forward.
dance with paragraph (3) or (4) of this subsection, to have (A) willfully or repeatedly failed
to comply substantially with the terms and conditions of any license, permit, certificate, or
other instrument or authorization issued by the Commission; (B) willfully or repeatedly
failed to comply with any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule, regulation, or order
issued by the Commission under this Act . . . shall be liable to the United States for a forfei-
ture penalty.").
342 47 U.S.C. § 403 ("The Commission shall have full authority and power at any time to
institute an inquiry, on its own motion, in any case and as to any matter or thing concerning
which complaint is authorized to be made, to or before the Commission by any provision of
this Act, or concerning which any question may arise under any of the provisions of this
Act, or relating to the enforcement of any of the provisions of this Act.").
343 47 C.F.R. § 1.7001(f) (2010) (failure to file Form 477 may lead to enforcement ac-
tion).
344 See supra Part II.H.
345 Supra Part 11.1.
346 Supra Part 11.1.
347 Open Internet Order, supra note 4, 1 59.
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